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THE DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
OF THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT:
TIME FOR RECONSIDERATION
OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS, JR.*
Introduction
Congress passed the Federal Tort Claims Act in 1946 to provide a means
by which the federal government could, like other employers, be held liable
for the torts of its employees committed within the scope of employment.
Prior to that time, relief against the United States in such situations could
be obtained only through passage of a private bill by Congress. The Federal
Tort Claims Act (the "Act") was designed to relieve Congress of the burden
of such bills and to assure a fairer and more readily available means of relief
to claimants.' Difficulty in the implementation of the Act soon surfaced,
however, because of the statute's provision that the waiver of governmental
immunity does not apply to any claim "based upon the exercise or perfor-
mance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether
or not the discretion involved be abused.
' 2
The leading case of Dalehite v. United States3 gave a broad reading to the
"discretionary function exception." In that case, the United States Supreme
Court indicated that the provision was intended to retain immunity in all situa-
tions involving formulation or execution of plans that were drawn at a high
governmental level and that entailed the exercise of judgment.' Dalehite pro-
* Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma. The author expresses deep appreciation to
his research assistant, Warren Fields.
1. See Baer, Suing Uncle Sam in Tort, 26 N.C.L. REV. 119 (1948); Smith, Claims Under
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 KAN. B.J. 25 (1973). See generally Comment, The Federal Tort
Claims Act, 56 YALE L.J. 534 (1947). The Federal Tort Claims Act, as amended, can be found
at 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671-2680 (1976). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1976) (United States as a
defendant).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). See Matthews, Federal Tort Claims Act-The Proper Scope
of the Discretionary Function Exception, 6 Az. U.L. REv. 22 (1957). See generally Stromswold,
The Twlight Zone of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 4 Am. U.L. REv. 41 (1955).
3. 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
4. Id. at 34-36. The case arose out of the Texas City, Texas, disaster of 1947, in which
fires and explosions occurred after the federal government had loaded ships with fertilizer, which
contained combustible material. The fertilizer was being loaded for export to foreign countries
as part of the nation's foreign aid program. Negligence was alleged in the adoption of the plan
to export the fertilizer and in the manufacture, handling, labeling, and loading of the fertilizer,
as well as in the government's failure to police the loading and fight the fire. Relief was eventual-
ly granted the disaster victims by means of a special bill through Congress; the relief was extend-
ed only to victims who were parties to the Dalehite suit. Act of Aug. 12, 1955, Pub. L. No.
84-378, 69 Stat. 707. See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act: A More Liberal Approach In-
dicated, 22 Mo. L. REv. 48 (1957).
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duced considerable adverse comment from scholars;' and the Court, in the
subsequent cases of Indian Towing v. United StateS6 and Rayonier v. United
States" appeared to adopt a more limited reading of the exception. The
modified interpretation immunized from liability only decisions and actions
that themselves involved "planning" or "policy-making," not the "opera-
tional" details of executing policies.' This planning v. operational level distinc-
tion was applied in numerous decisions by lower federal courts.'
Twenty years ago, the distinction appeared to be a widely accepted com-
promise between the extremes of ignoring the exception, on the one hand,
or, on the other hand, letting the exception swallow the Act. At that time,
this author endorsed that compromise, 0 though the compromise had its
5. See Note, Torts-Supreme Court Extends Immunity for Discretionary Function to Govern-
ment Manufacturing, 3 BUFFALO L, REv. 163 (1953); Note, Discretionary Exception Under Federal
Tort Claims Act: Sovereign Immunity Dies a Slow Death, 4 DUrKE B.J. 34 (1954); Note, Federal
Tort Claims Act-Discretionary Function Exception, 8 RUToERS L. REv. 412 (1954); Note, Texas
City Disaster-Federal Tort Claims Act, 22 U.K.C.L. Rav. 176 (1954); Note, Tort Claims Act-
Discretionary Exception Precludes Federal Liability in Texas City Explosion, 101 U. PA. L. REv.
420 (1952). Some found the decision largely unobjectionable. See Note, Torts-Federal Tort
Claims Act-Discretionary Function Exception, 38 MiNN. L. REv. 175 (1954). Others believed
that, because of the unusual fact situation there presented, the case would have limited impor-
tance. See Heuser, Dalehite v. United States: A New Approach to the Federal Tort Claims Act,
7 VAND. L. REV. 175 (1954).
6. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). The government had conceded that no discretionary function was
actually involved in the case-which concerned the Coast Guard's allegedly negligent operation
of a lighthouse-but contended that there could be no liability for a uniquely governmental ac-
tivity. The Court rejected that argument. See generally Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the
Federal Tort Claims Act, 14 Am. U.L. REv. 200, 206 (1965).
7. 352 U.S. 315 (1957). This case dealt with alleged negligence of the Forest Service in fighting
a forest fire. The discretionary function exception was found irrelevant, though without extended
discussion. The Court, reaffirming the view taken in Indian Towing Co., indicated that the United
States is in general liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act whenever a private person would
be liable under the same circumstances. See generally Pound, The Tort Claims Act: Reason or
History?, 30 NACCA L.J. 404 (1964).
8. For a discussion of this more limited view of immunity, see Note, Federal Tort Claims
Act-Discretionary Function Exception, 39 B.U.L. Rav. 268 (1959); Note, Torts-Federal Tort
Claims Act-The Discretionary Function Exemption to the Federal Tort Claims Act Is Limited
Strictly to Policy Formulation, 45 U. CIN. L. REv. 157 (1976); Note, Torts-Federal Tort Claims
Act-Psychiatrists' Diagnosis Is Discretionary Act Within Exception to Governmental Tort Liability,
48 VA. L. REv. 1480 (1962).
9. See Downs v. United States, 522 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1975) (F.B.I. agent's handling of
airline hijacking situation not discretionary); White v. United States, 317 F.2d 13 (4th Cir. 1963)
(decision to let mental patient roam hospital grounds unsupervised was operational); United States
v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98 (9th Cir. 1962) (negligent construction of drainage ditch and sewage.
disposal system held operational); United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1962) (deci-
sion to renovate canals was at planning level); American Exch. Bank v. United States, 257 F.2d
938 (7th Cir. 1958) (non-installation of handrail at post office was operational); Eastern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd mem. sub nom. 350 U.S.
907 (1955) (air traffic controllers held to be acting at operational level).
10. Reynolds, The Discretionary Function Exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 57 GEo.




critics. " What has transpired in the past twenty years? Has the compromise
position clearly prevailed, or have the courts returned to the sweeping ap-
plication given the exception in the Dalehite case? Consider the following oc-
currences: (1) continued use by the lower federal courts of the tests earlier
formulated; (2) the leading Supreme Court case of recent years in this area;
(3) how that case reflects or rejects prior authority and suggestions of com-
mentators; (4) the reaction to that opinion in subsequent cases and writings;
and (5) conclusions that may be drawn as to the desirable state of the law.
Continued Development of Planning v. Operational Test
For some years, the planning v. operational distinction was much used in
lower federal courts and was often taken as the accepted standard in applying
the exception. Thus, in a 1981 case in which the United States was sued for
alleged negligence in licensing a private company for manufacture of polio
vaccine, it was held that the exception's applicability could not be determined
without evidence of whether the licensing decision involved policy-making on
the part of the government.'" The "policy-making" test for deciding the ex-
ception's relevance was said to be "in accord with the weight and trend of
authority," both in the cases and the writings. 3 Liability was conceded to
be possible, where the government's negligence in a approving a specific batch
of vaccine was shown because such negligence was outside the exception's
scope.' 4 This did not necessarily mean, however, that liability could be im-
posed for governmental approval of a formula for a type of vaccine." The
"planning" level, to which immunity applies, has generally been said to in-
volve policy-making, such as establishing basic goals and programs for the
country's economic and social well-being, while the operational level involves
the day-to-day routine operation of the government.' 6 A court must consider
evidence of the nature of the particular, allegedly tortious act in making the
planning v. operational classification.'
11. See Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary
Function Exception, 31 WASH. L. REv. 207 (1956).
12. Schindler v. United States, 661 F.2d 552, 557 (6th Cir. 1981). See Berkowitz v. United
States, 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988), discussed infra notes 131-34 and accompanying text, saying that
liability depends on whether "policy choices" were involved in the licensing of a vaccine, but
very broadly defining such choices.
13. Schindler, 661 F.2d at 555 (citing Wright v. United States, 568 F.2d 153 (10th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978)); Blessing v. United States, 447 F. Supp. 1160 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
14. Schindler, 661 F.2d at 556 (citing Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa.
1972), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974)).
15. Schindler, 661 F.2d at 556.
16. See Madison v. United States, 679 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1982) (award of government con-
tract for manufacturer of explosives and promulgation of safety manual and regulations for
government contractors were within exception).
17. See Driscoll v. United States, 525 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1975) (decision not to install warn-
ing devices, barriers, speed control devices, etc. on air force base streets held to have been made
at planning, not operational, level); Abraham v. United States, 465 F.2d 881, 883 (5th Cir. 1972)
1989]
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It has been recognized that "discretion," in a broad sense, is involved in
all decisions and choices. To come within the exception, the "discretion" must
encompass deliberation or the setting of goals-for instance, the judgment
involved in issuing a permit to hold a motorcycle race on federal land, as
opposed to the more mundane judgment involved in the operational tasks
of setting out and marking the race course. 8 Drawing a line between what
are essentially only different kinds of "discretionary" acts is, at best, a dif-
ficult chore. The planning v. operational test has been attacked as producing
inconsistent results in application,' 9 as illustrated by one case which found
that dredging of irrigation canals involves planning"0 while another case ruled
that faulty construction of a sewage disposal system is operational. 2'
Commentators have also criticized the planning v. operational test as in-
volving no more than a "status" distinction that finds "discretion" in, and
therefore gives immunity to, all conduct undertaken by anyone in a relatively
high government position.2" Certainly it is true that the governmental rank
of the person making the allegedly tortious decision has sometimes been a
consideration in application of the planning v. operational test. Courts have
often denied immunity where the person was not a member of a tribunal or
legislative body or head of an executive department. One example is air traf-
fic controllers. Despite the obviously great amount of judgment that air traf-
fic controllers must exercise in performing their job, courts have held their
giving directions to planes preparing to land at an airport to be at the opera-
tional level.2 3 Another example, the government's operation of dams, may
come within the exception in many respects; but, Bureau of Reclamation
employees' failure to post warnings to water skiers in a particular recreational
area behind a dam is at the operational level.
2 4
(affidavit of air force officer merely stating opinion that mismanagement causing sonic boom
had occurred at operational level raised no genuine issue of material fact where nature of
mismanagement was not described).
18. See Thompson v. United States, 592 F.2d 1104 (9th Cir. 1979).
19. Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 67 GEo. L.J. 879, 888-89 (1979). See generally Note, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of
the Planning Level-Operational Level Test, 11 U.S.F. L. REv. 170 (1976).
20. United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d 11, 13 (10th Cir. 1962).
21. United States v. Hunsucker, 314 F.2d 98, 105 (9th Cir. 1962).
22. See Comment, supra note 19, at 889. Thus, the author notes, liability may sometimes
be rejected for a high official's actions even if they really amount to no more than ordinary
operational-level negligence, or the actions of even a low-level officer may be found immune
if they were approved by a superior in a clearly planning-level position. Id. & n.95.
23. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Union Trust Co., 221 F.2d 62 (D.C. Cir. 1955), aff'd mem.
sub nom., 350 U.S. 907 (1955). Cf. Sullivan v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala.
1968), aff'd, 411 F.2d 794 (5th Cir. 1969) (preparation of flight chart operational); Wildwood
Mink Ranch v. United States, 218 F. Supp. 67 (D. Minn. 1963) (carelessness in selection of
flight plan held operational). See generally Annotation, Liability of United States for Negligence
of Air Traffic Controllers, 46 A.L.R. FED. 24, 33-37 (1980).
24. Lindgren v. United States, 665 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1982). The court stated that the prevailing
test in the Ninth Circuit is the planning-v.-operational test as enunciated in Thompson v. United
States, 592 F.2d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 1979) (cited in Lindgren, 665 F.2d at 980). The Lindgren
court distinguished Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 611 (D. Kan. 1970),
affl'd, 445 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1971), where the lowering of the water level in a reservoir by
the Corps of Engineers was held discretionary. It was noted that the Spillway case involved damage
[Vol. 42
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A subtest within the basic planning v. operational test has sometimes emerg-
ed: the distinction between policy-making and implementation. Thus, a govern-
ment agency's decision to ignore one of its own regulations in a particular
situation may be found operational, while the agency's issuance of a notice
to its field personnel instructing them in general terms to ignore the regula-
tion may be considered policy-making.25 The former stituation involves mere
implementation, or nonimplementation, of existing policy in a specific instance,
while the latter situation essentially involves reframing or repealing the basic
rule. It is generally agreed that the establishing, promulgating and repealing
of laws and regulations is at the policy-making level.26 Issuance of, or refusal
to issue, a license or permit has usually been similarly treated as policy-
making, 27 as has the decision of government officials to prosecute or not pro-
secute a suspected lawbreaker.28 Because some judgment is involved in any
action (or inaction), the essential question is whether exercise of the judg-
ment required policy considerations.29 Thus, courts have called the ordering
of an army maneuver discretionary, while negligent operation of a vehicle
during the maneuver involves implementation and would be at the operational
level, and thus nondiscretionary.30 Where facts must be weighed and policy
considerations balanced in making a decision, as in deciding whether to order
the closing of a mine, courts have found the exercise of such planning discre-
tion.3 '
directly caused by government action; to require the government to give warnings in all situa-
tions in which its conduct might cause damage was considered too great a burden. On the other
hand, in Lindgren the government's action produced only a hazard, no direct damage; to require
a warning in those situations was deemed not administratively burdensome. Lindgren, 665 F.2d
at 981-82.
25. See Hoffman v. United States, 398 F. Supp. 530 (E.D. Mich. 1975) (Federal Aviation
Administration ignored own regulation and subsequently made policy decision to formulate a
notice which in effect instructed its field personnel to ignore regulation).
26. See Garbarino v. United States, 666 F.2d 1061 (6th Cir. 1981) (Federal Aviation Agen-
cy's adoption of standards for certification of aircraft).
27. Lawrence v. United States, 381 F.2d 989 (9th Cir. 1967) (failure to issue permits to oc-
cupy Indian lands); United States v. Morrell, 331 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 879 (1964) (issuance of grazing permits as to public lands); Chournos v. United States,
193 F.2d 321 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 977 (1952) (denial of grazing permits as
to public lands); Smith v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 87 (D. Colo. 1951), appeal dismissed,
196 F.2d 222 (10th Cir. 1952) (reduction of grazing privileges as to public lands).
28. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 841 (1967);
Brooks v. United States, 152 F. Supp. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). Cf. Goddard v. District of Colum-
bia Redevelopment Land Agency, 287 F.2d 343 (D.C. Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 910
(1961) (decision on institution of condemnation proceedings). The giving of legal advice may,
however, be outside the area of immunity. See Matthews v. United States, 456 F.2d 395 (5th
Cir. 1972) (complaint based on alleged negligent acts or omissions of air force legal personnel
held to state a claim; should not have been dismissed on basis of misrepresentation exception
of Federal Tort Claims Act).
29. See Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059, 1064 (3d Cir. 1974).
30. See Ward v. United States, 471 F.2d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 1973).
31. Bernitsky v. United States, 620 F.2d 948 (3d Cir. 1980). Cf. Old King Coal Co. v. United
States, 88 F. Supp. 124 (S.D. Iowa 1949) (coal mine owner did not have Federal Tort Claims
Act suit based on administrative decision not to operate coal mine).
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Another subtest sometimes stated involves the presence of a pre-existing
standard. If a government official is merely called on to apply a standard
that is already established or readily ascertainable, the government official's
conduct does not necessitate such exercise of discretion as to come within
the exception. However, if the government official must consider the pur-
poses of a law and, in light of those purposes, decide whether the policy ap-
plies in the particular case, the exception does apply. 2 Courts have held ap-
plying parole guidelines in determining the release of a particular prisoner
to be operational," while holding the decision to conduct Air Force training
flights in supersonic aircraft-a decision not governed by existing regulations
but made by the Commander of the Strategic Air Command-to be at the
planning level.34 Furthermore, courts have held that statutes give bank ex-
aminers such a great amount of leeway in performing their job that policy-
making, not mere operation, is present in their conduct."
Sometimes, the various subtests overlap and more than one may be utilized
in a particular opinion. Thus, courts have held the performance of scientific
evaluation, as in the testing of polio vaccine, involves implementation, not
policy-making. These scientific evaluations also concern the application of
existing regulations so that the discretionary function exception does not cover
this situation.
36
The tests and standards used in applying the discretionary function excep-
tion of the Act-particularly the planning v. operational distinction-have
influenced some state courts, which often have to interpret state statutory
provisions similar to the federal exception. Thus, in applying its legislation
on governmental tort liability, Alaska has held failure to maintain a highway
properly is negligence at the operational, not policy-making level, and therefore
outside that state's discretionary function exception." California has reasoned
32. See Barton v. United States, 609 F.2d 977 (10th Cir. 1979) (no fixed standards or guides
exist by which effect of drought on range forage can be judged for purpose of determining whether
grazing should be allowed to continue on public lands).
33. Payton v. United States, 636 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1981).
34. Maynard v. United States, 430 F.2d 1264 (9th Cir. 1970).
35. Emch v. United States, 630 F.2d 523 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 966 (1981).
Cf. Davis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 369 F. Supp. 277 (D. Colo. 1974) (issuance of cease-
and-desist order to bank by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation held discretionary).
36. Griffin v. United States, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974). See Loge v. United States, 662
F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981) (discretionary function exception did not bar suit based on alleged
negligence in licensing vaccine and in releasing particular lot), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
See generally infra notes 130-34 and accompanying text, discussing Berkowitz v. United States,
108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988) (exception inapplicable if vaccine licensed without compliance with statutory
or regulatory requirements).
37. State v. Abbott, 498 P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972). Cf. Aspen Exploration Corp. v. Sheffield,
739 P.2d 150 (Alaska 1987) (governor's rejection of offshore prospecting permits held discre-
tionary and absolutely immune in suit brought against governor personally). As the Aspen case
indicates, a somewhat different test is often applied in cases dealing with the individual liability
of government officers: instead of using the planning-v.-operational test, the courts consider
"discretion" for purposes of personal immunity to mean personal deliberation and judgment.
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that the purpose of its discretionary function exception is to protect the policy
decisions of coordinate branches of state government from judicial scrutiny.
Therefore, California applies immunity to the formulation of policy but not
to implementation of policy. 38 Washington State has gone so far as to infer
a discretionary function exception from a statute not expressly providing one.
The Washington statute declares that liability cannot be imposed in cases ques-
tioning the propriety of government objectives or programs. 39
Preservation of governmental freedom of choice in the adoption of basic
policies justifies the Test. One commentator has observed that most planning
activities, such as the promulgation of administrative regulations, involve public
policy considerations, are of future effect, and affect large numbers of peo-
ple."' These actions are normally subject to judicial review through suits for
injunctions, declaratory judgments or mandamus. However, tort suits leading
to possible liability are precluded as likely to curtail governmental in-
dependence. Alternatively, a tort suit for damages may be used to challenge
conduct undertaken to carry out the plans-that is, operational conduct. Such
conduct is subject to remedy in tort because it normally involves only the
manner of execution-a matter not determined until the execution actually
occurs.41
Tort liability is appropriate where a government program is negligently ad-
ministered. However, tort liability is inappropriate where the decision, even
if improper, is made to undertake the program in the first place. Freedom
from liability is necessary to assure independence of action in the setting of
basic government policy-that is, in those areas where costs must be weighed
against benefits in choosing or rejecting a course of action. Otherwise, fear
of liability may outweigh need and wisdom in selection of government pro-
grams. One example of such a program is the establishment of a communica-
tion system between government drug informants and their contacts in an
effort to control dangerous drugs. 2 Risks must be balanced against the need
for action and the chance of success. It is really not "discretion" in the sense
of "judgment" that the courts consider in need of protection in such situa-
tions so much as it is the selecting of goals and plans for the future. '
3
Several commentators have severely criticized the Test, chiefly on the grounds
that (1) it places too much weight on the rank of the alleged tortfeasor as
opposed to the type of activity involved; (2) it fails to ensure predictability
of result; (3) it produces confusing and inconsistent case law, and (4) it leads
to uneven application.4 While it can be argued that the Test is designed mainly
38. See Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 447 P.2d 352 (1968)
39. Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965).
40. Rogers, supra note 37, at 817.
41. See id. at 817-18.
42. See Slagle v. United States, 612 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1980) (policy decision whether benefits
of fool-proof means of rapid communication justified costs involved discretionary function).
43. See United States v. Gregory, 300 F.2d at 13 (suggesting that at the operational level
there may, at least sometimes, be liability for even discretionary functions).
44. See Note, supra note 19, at 181-89.
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to protect decisions that initiate programs or general policies from liability, 4
courts have had difficulty, and shown inconsistency, in deciding how far down
the line the immunity should extend. Courts have sometimes applied immun-
ity to decisions clearly subsequent to initiation of a policy, as where, in the
course of dredging a river channel, a decision was made to dump the dredged
soil on adjacent land rather than take it out to sea.4" It is possible some of
the confusion results merely from differing terminology (such as "planning"
or "policy-making") used to mean the same'thing. Additionally, confusion
may result from the different treatment accorded scientific decision-making
from that accorded government policy-making. Scientific decision-making is
regarded as merely entailing consideration of objective facts and thus opera-
tional.
47
The planning v. operational test does give recognition to the strong feeling
that government decision-makers must be free to act and experiment without
the fear of subjecting the government to liability in those areas in which a
number of options are available and in which some citizens are likely to be
dissatisfied with any decision made." But the question may then be raised:
Why not end the confusion of determining where "planning" ends and "opera-
tion" begins by limiting the exception's application to the initial choice to
undertake a program? At the same time, courts could accord immunity to
basic policy choices that Congress apparently intended to immunize. Courts
have occasionally mentioned such a limitation on the exception in cases primari-
ly employing the planning v. operational test.4 9 Beyond that, some opinions
have used the "initiation" limitation as a test in itself-sometimes referred
to as the "Good Samaritan" test.50
45. See Note, The Discretionary Exception and Municipal Tort Liability: A Reappraisal, 52
MINN. L. REv. 1047, 1060-64 (1968) (discussing federal cases interpreting the discretionary func-
tion exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act and arguing they cannot appropriately be used
in applying the statutory exception for discretionary acts of municipalities under Minnesota law).
46. Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F. Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
47. See Harris & Schnepper, Federal Tort Claims Act: Discretionary Function Exception
Revisited, 31 U. MIAMI L. REv. 161, 172 (1976). This article contains a good statement of the
general rejection of the sweeping Dalehite interpretation of the exception that occurred in the
quarter century that followed the Dalehite case: "Modern cases make it clear that the absolutist
interpretation of the discretionary function exception taken by the Dalehite majority has not
been adopted. In order to fall within the scope of the exception, it is not sufficient for the govern-
ment to demonstrate merely that some choice was part of the decisionmaking process." Id. at
171 (citing J.H. Rutter Rex Mfg. Co. v. United States, 515 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
424 U.S. 954 (1976)).
48. See Comment, Agent Orange and the Government Contract Defense: Are Military Manufac-
turers Immune from Products Liability?, 36 U. MrInA L. Rav. 489, 520-21 (1982) (discussing
the reasons for governmental immunity as to discretionary decisions).
49. See Seaboard Coast Line R.R. v. United States, 473 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1973) (once govern-
ment decided to build drainage ditch in course of constructing aircraft maintenance facility, it
was no longer performing discretionary function and was required to perform operational task
of building ditch in a nonnegligent manner).





Continued Development of "Good Samaritan" Test
The United States Supreme Court in Indian Towing v. United States,"1
employed the Good Samaritan test and held the federal government to the
same standard of reasonable care to which a private person would be held
whenever the government, even though voluntarily, undertakes a particular
activity. In Indian Towing, the government activity was operating a lighthouse.
Unless required by law to act, the government is free to be either active or
passive without risk of liability; but, once the decision is made for the govern-
ment to engage in an activity, the usual rules of tort liability apply to its
conduct, regardless of whether the initial decision was at the planning or opera-
tional level. 2 The Good Samaritan test, also known as the "Good Samaritan
doctrine," derived its name from cases where the government voluntarily under-
took conduct helpful to others.5 3 Courts have applied the Good Samaritan
test to a number of cases involving public works projects, such as dams and
flood control facilities. Once the initial decision to undertake such a project
is made, decisions about the details of design and operation will be outside
the scope of immunity-for instance, when a naval radio tower was built
without guard rails, causing a painter on the tower to fall to his death.54
The distinction between policy-making and implementation creeps into the
Good Samaritan test also. If policy factors have to be weighed in deciding
the design for the project, the design decisions may be considered discretionary.
Two examples of discretionary design decisions were: (1) a decision facing
the Secretary of Commerce of whether the proposed design for an interstate
highway was adequate to meet traffic needs, 5 and (2) consideration by the
Army Corps of Engineers of navigational needs, irrigation requirements and
rainfall in determining whether to release or store water in a reservoir. 6 In-
deed, the Good Samaritan test is often used in conjunction with the planning
51. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). See authorities cited supra note 6.
52. See Indian Towing Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 61, 64 (1955). While Dalehite had
stated that, even under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a presumption of governmental immunity
exists until overcome by clear Congressional relinquishment, Indian Towing Co. indicates that
the intent of the Act was to relinquish immunity except as clearly provided to the contrary.
For further discussion, see the dissenting opinion in Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 803 (1972) (citing
Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315, 319-20).
53. See Block v. Neal, 460 U.S. 289, 294 (1983) (Court distinguishing between a question
involving the "misrepresentation" exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act from questions dealing
with "Good Samaritan" claims).
54. Stanley v. United States, 347 F. Supp. 1088 (D. Me. 1972), vacated on other grounds,
476 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1973). For application of the exception to public works projects, see generally
Harris & Schnepper, supra note 47, at 182-84.
55. See Daniel v. United States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970).
56. Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United States, 330 F. Supp. 611 (D. Kan. 1970), aff'd., 445
F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1971). Cf. Boston Edison Co. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 423
F.2d 891 (1st Cir. 1970) (Secretary of Army's decision to dredge river held discretionary); York
Cove Corp. v. United States, 317 F. Supp. 799 (E.D. Va. 1970) (negligence in conducting dredg-
ing operation would be discretionary).
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v. operational standard. This use of the Good Samaritan test occurs because
the immunized "decision to initiate" is frequently interpreted to mean the
same thing as the "planning-level decision," while the subsequent perform-
ance is, at least to the extent that it does not involve policy choices, character-
ized as being at the operational level." Thus, one court has called the deci-
sion to construct a drainage ditch "discretionary" because planning was in-
volved, and termed the subsequent functions of design and construction
"operational" and thus nondiscretionary2 8
The Good Samaritan test tends to encourage inaction in areas were the
government is accorded discretion regarding whether to act. Thus, if the Coast
Guard is by statute granted discretionary authority to establish aids to naviga-
tion, it will not be liable for a failure to act-such as a failure to erect a
light at the end of a breakwater3 9 Neither will the Coast Guard be liable
for an initial decision to take action; but in then acting, it will be subject
to possible liability, as where it negligently locates a buoy at an improper
place.60 In cases of governmental medical treatment, the United States will
be liable for negligent treatment once the providing of such care, even volun-
tarily, is commenced. 6' The refusal to treat, on the other hand, will be within
the area of immunity so long as the government has discretion to refuse. But
an "undertaking" to treat can often be found where the government pro-
vides very little care. Thus, the government may be held liable for negligent
care if it had treated the patient in the past, known of the patient's condition,
and examined the patient, though it then declined to admit this patient to
the hospital. 62 Similarly, once the government incarcerates a prisoner, it is
held to a standard of due care in determining the specific facility in which
to confine the prisoner.
63
One court held that although the initial decision of the government to
establish an air traffic control system is discretionary, once that decision is
made the government's employees are responsible for operating the system
with reasonable care. The government is liable for acts of both commission
and omission. 6" Thus, the government can be liable for a controller's incor-
57. See Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 67 GEo. L.J. 879, 889-91 (1979). The author concludes that the "Good Samaritan
test" parallels the planning-v.-operational test and, like the latter, fails to offer courts any clear
guidance when facing a new fact situation. Id. at 890.
58. Seaboard Coast Line R.R., 473 F.2d at 716.
59. Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980).
60. Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States, 193 F.2d 631, 635 (4th Cir. 1951).
61. See Rise v. United States, 630 F.2d 1068 (5th Cir. 1980) (having undertaken to provide
medical treatment to wife of retired Army officer, Army owed duty of reasonable care, which
did not come within exception). See also Kiel, Medical Malpractice Claims Against the Army,
75 Mm. L. Ray. 1 (1977).
62. Supchak v. United States, 365 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1966).
63. Brown v. United States, 374 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Ark. 1974) (liability imposed for negligence
in placing federal prisoner in substandard county jail, where he was assaulted by other inmates).
64. Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 373 F.2d 227 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S.




rect report to a pilot of "minimum descent altitude" if this results in a crash
of the plane or other harm.s Similarly, the government can be liable for
negligently stationing an airport attendant in a room so insulated that the
attendant cannot hear circling aircraft and is unaware of the need for him
to turn on runway lights.' The government can also be liable for publishing
false information about runway lighting. 67 Of course, in any such situation,
the United States is liable only for negligence or other tortious conduct. It
is not, for instance, liable for the publication of false information unless this
occurred through a lack of reasonable care.68 There is also the usual require-
ment of actual causation: a failure to inspect an aircraft or warn of possible
danger will, for example, not lead to liability unless the omitted inspection
or warning would have prevented plaintiff's harm.6 9
Continued Development of Dalehite Tests
In addition to using the aforementioned planning v. operational test and
the Good Samaritan standard, courts applying the discretionary function ex-
ception have sometimes simply relied on a very broad interpretation of "discre-
tionary." Courts have found discretion present, for example, in any decision,
no matter how narrow or trivial, carrying out an undertaking that in its in-
itiation involved planning or policy-making. 0 Their findings may be considered
an application of the reasoning of the leading Dalehite case, since immunity
was there extended to the manufacturing, bagging and labeling of fertilizer
partly because the basic decision to undertake the fertilizer export program
had occurred on the planning level. 1 Because Dalehite spoke in terms of the
planning level and the operational level, it may be considered to support the
planning v. operational test as well. 72 But since the case immunized practical-
ly everything involved in executing a planning decision, one commentator
v.-operational test-with the same result of possible liability. See United Air Lines v. Wiener,
335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. dismissed, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). See generally supra note
23 and accompanying text.
65. Ross v. United States, 640 F.2d 511 (5th Cir. 1981).
66. Sullivan v. United States, 299 F. Supp. 621 (N.D. Ala. 1968), aff'd., 411 F.2d 784 (5th
Cir. 1969).
67. Murray v. United States, 327 F. Supp. 835 (D. Utah 1971) (alleged negligence in publishing
and disseminating aeronautical charts and information falsely indicating that either runway lighting
at airport was available throughout night or that it was available upon request).
68. See Swoboda v. United States, 662 F.2d 326 (5th Cir. 1981) (FAA exercised reasonable
care in notifying proper authorities of pilot's difficulties after he was overdue and failed to make
position report), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1134 (1982).
69. See Zabala Clemente v. United States, 567 F.2d 1140 (1st Cir. 1977) (failure to inspect
plane did not add to risk of injury to passengers or crew), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1006 (1978).
70. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 108-10.
71. Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 38-42 (1953). See Reynolds, supra note 10, at
93-94, 96-98.
72. See Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 34-36. But it has been noted that the planning-v.-operational
language in Dalehite is dictum. Peck, The Federal Tort Claims Act-A Proposed Construction
of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WAsH. L. REv. 207, 219 n.37 (1956).
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regarded Dalehite as chiefly illustrating a very broad application of the ex-
ception and a very narrow application of the Act.
7 3
Another author suggested that Dalehite supports the exception's relevance
wherever any degree of judgment ("discretion") is involved in the allegedly
tortious governmental conduct, even if at the operational level. Thus, courts
should not "read in" any planning v. operational, or similar, distinction unless
the Act is amended to provide this.74 This use of Dalehite is sometimes referred
to as involving a "quality of decision" test since it applies the exception
whenever a governmental decision-maker, at any level, considers policy factors
in acting within his authority by making a decision."
Thus, Dalehite has been relied on by cases taking two slightly differing,
but both very broad, interpretations of the exception: (1) interpreting it as
immunizing every act undertaken in the execution of an initial policy deci-
sion, and (2) interpreting it as immunizing all decisions, however detailed and
at however low a level, that involve some policy choices. In either case, the
result is an interpretation that can leave the Act nearly emasculated by the
exception.
The Varig Case: Returning to Dalehite?
While some of the above-cited cases indicated for a time a trend away from
the broad Dalehite interpretation of the exception, the United States Supreme
Court reaffirmed Dalehite in the 1984 case of United States v. S.A. Empresa
de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Airlines).7 6 In Varig the plaintiff alleged
negligence in the FAA's failure to check specific items in the course of certi-
fying two particular aircraft for use in commercial flight. In one of the con-
solidated cases, the lavatory trash receptacle allegedly did not meet applicable
safety regulations, leading to an on-board fire that killed most of the
passengers. In the other case, a gasoline-burning heater was held not to have
73. See Jacoby, Roads to the Demise of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 29 ADMIN.
L. REv. 265, 285 (1977) (referring to Dalehite's "very strict interpretation" of the Act, followed
by more liberal interpretations in later cases).
74. Comment, Discretionary Function Exception to Federal Tort Liability, 2 CumB. L. Rv.
383, 399-400 (1971). The author views the planning-v.-operational distinction as not intended
by Congress. Id. at 383. The author further states this distinction is not specifically supported
by Dalehite, which refers to the distinction but does not clearly base its finding of immunity
on it. See id. at 393.
75. See Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception Under the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 67 GEo. L.J. 879, 891-93 (1979). The author finds the quality-of-decision test sup-
ported by Dalehite's reference to discretion depending upon "policy judgment and decision."
Id. at 892. Among other cases cited as supporting this test are First Nat'l Bank in Albuquerque
v. United States, 552 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1977) (immunity for approval of warning labels on
grain), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 835 (1977); Griffin v. United States, 351 F. Supp. 10 (E.D. Pa.
1972) (no immunity for negligent releases of defective polio vaccine following scientific evalua-
tion), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1059 (3d Cir. 1974); Pigott v. United States, 451 F.2d 574 (5th Cir. 1971)
(per curiam; vacating district court ruling of immunity as to test firing of NASA rocket).




been in compliance with federal regulations. The Court found both suits barred
by the discretionary function exception. Citing Dalehite with approval and
indicating that there had been no retreat from its broad application of the
exception, the Court stated that: (1) it is the nature of the allegedly tortious
conduct, not the status of the actor who engages in the conduct, that deter-
mines the exception's relevance; (2) the exception clearly covers the govern-
ment's discretionary acts in regulating the conduct of private parties; (3) the
FAA's implementation of a mechanism, such as spot-checks, to enforce com-
pliance with its regulations is a discretionary decision and thus within the ex-
ception and (4) the acts of FAA employees in executing the spot-checks are
also within the exception since those employees are "specifically empowered
to make policy judgments" '77 in administering the program.
Varig seems to take the "quality of decision" approach and apply immunity
to any determination, no matter at what level and without regard to any "plan-
ning" or "operational" label, that involves the weighing of policy factors.
The Court adopted a rule of absolute immunity more sweeping as to the federal
government than as to federal officials sued as individuals." The Court clearly
repudiated, as to government liability, any test based on the status of the
officer or employee whose conduct is alleged to have been tortious. The Court
implicity rejected both the planning v. operational test and the Good Samaritan
test, 9 and it continued the trend of rigid interpretation of the Act indicated
by its earlier holding that the United States cannot be held strictly liable (that
is, liable without fault) under that law.80
77. Id. at 820. There was a significant difference in the facts of the two cases consolidated
in the Court's Varig decision: in Varig, the FAA had decided not to inspect the aircraft lavatory,
where the harmful defect appeared. Varig Airlines v. United States, 16 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,577,
17,586-89 (C.D. Cal. May 12, 1981), aff'd, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 794
(1984). In the other case, the FAA had actually inspected the aircraft's heater which subsequent-
ly proved defective. United Scottish Ins. Co. v. United States, No. CV71-36E, slip op. at 2 (S.D.
Cal. Feb. 24, 1980), aff'd, 692 F.2d 1209 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 U.S. 797 (1984). The Court
ignored the factual distinction and thus appeared to apply the discretionary function exception
even to a negligent inspection. See Comment, United States v. Varig Airlines: The Supreme Court
Narrows the Scope of Government Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 J. AiR L.
& Com. 197, 215-21 (1985). On the differences between the two consolidated cases, see generally
Comment, United States v. Varig: Can the King Only Do Little Wrongs?, 22 CAL. W.L. REv.
175, 186-92 (1985).
78. See Westfall v. Erwin, 108 S. Ct. 580 (1988) (conduct of federal officials is immune
from state-law tort liability only if it is discretionary, and fact that precise conduct was not
mandated by law is insufficient to establish discretionary nature; absolute immunity unnecessary
and unwise in many situations). Cf. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (executive of-
ficials of federal government generally enjoy only qualified or "good faith" immunity from
personal liability for unconstitutional conduct; federal officials seeking absolute immunity must
bear burden of showing that public policy requires such exemption).
79. See Varig, 467 U.S. at 811-14.
80. Laird v. Nelms, 406 U.S. 797 (1972) (no strict liability due to presence of ultrahazardous
activity for planning or operation of supersonic flight). See Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Call for
Review and Revision of the Federal Tort Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. Rav. 391 (1973); Reynolds,
Strict Liability Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: Does "Wrongful" Cover a Few Sins, No
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Previously, a minority of lower federal courts took this approach to the
discretionary function exception. Two courts held the decision of when to
impound and when to release water stored in a government reservoir to be
"discretionary."' Finding policy factors inevitably involved, the Fifth Cir-
cuit had made a similarly broad application of the exception to the deter-
mination by government attorneys of whether to prosecute particular persons.2
In awarding contracts, government officers do not act in a purely ministerial
fashion83 but are accorded some discretion, for the exercise or abuse of which
the government is not liable. The same has been held true of officers' renewal
or nonrenewal of government contracts.
84
More specifically as in the Varig case, federal courts have previously treated
government promulgation of regulations or failure to promulgate regulations
as within the discretion broadly protected from liability by the exception."
Enforcement of regulations has been similarly treated when the enforcing of-
ficer was granted authority to make exceptions-namely, to decide when the
policy behind the regulation required the policy's application and when the
policy was inapplicable. Thus, the commander of a military reservation was
held to be acting within the exception when deciding under what circumstances
to allow political demonstrations on the reservation." The court reasoned such
a decision required consideration and balancing of policy factors (free speech
v. national security, etc.), as contrasted with the decision of an air traffic
controller to give a pilot clearance for take-off. The controller's decision calls
for considerable judgment and deliberation but does not involve policy choices
Sins, or Non-Sins?, 23 AM. U.L. REv. 813 (1974). While Dalehite had found no strict liability
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, there were later indications that such liability might be allow-
ed, and thus the question remained in some doubt until Laird. See Reynolds, supra note 10,
at 94 n.71.
81. Pierce v. United States, 650 F.2d 202 (9th Cir. 1981); Spillway Marina, Inc. v. United
States, 330 F. Supp. 611 (D. Kan. 1970), aff'd, 445 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1971).
82. Smith v. United States, 375 F.2d 243 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 844 (1967).
The court stated: "Most conscious acts of any person whether he works for the government
or not, involve choice. Unless government officials (at no matter what echelon) make their choices
by flipping coins, their acts involve discretion in making decisions." Id. at 246. Cf. Butz v.
Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978) (officials of federal agencies who perform functions analogous
to those of a prosecutor are entitled to absolute immunity from damages for their decisions
to initiate or continue a proceeding).
83. Scanwell Laboratories, Inc. v. Thomas, 521 F.2d 941 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (claim of disap-
pointed bidder that contract had been awarded another due to Federal Aviation Administra-
tion's acceptance of nonresponsive bid showed at most an abuse of discretion), cert. denied,
425 U.S. 910 (1976).
84. See Myers & Myers, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 527 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 1975)
(postal service's contract-renewal conduct).
85. See Loge v. United States, 662 F.2d 1268 (8th Cir. 1981) (government allegedly negligent
in promulgating or failing to promulgate regulations that would ensure safety of live, oral polio-
virus vaccine), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 944 (1982).
86. Kiiskila v. United States, 466 F.2d 626 (7th Cir. 1972) (regulation generally prohibited




and is not immune from liability.817 But in the years just prior to Varig, cases
taking such a broad view of the exception had become fairly rare.
On the other hand, the Varig opinion is, in some respects, in line with trends
previously evidenced in Supreme Court and lower federal court cases: Varig
firmly establishes as law the view that it is the nature of the decision, not
the rank of the decision-maker, that determines the discretionary exception's
application.88 Varig reiterates the definition of "discretionary acts" as those
that involve some policy judgment and decision. 9 This interpretation is in
accord with the oft-made assumption that the legislative intent in including
the discretionary function exception in the Act was the protection of policy
decisions from judicial interference." The case also illustrates again the
Supreme Court's tendency to give broad application to the Act's exceptions
in order to achieve Congress' purpose of seeing that certain governmental
activities are not disrupted. 9'
Prior to Varig, it had been possible to interpret the leading Dalehite case
in at least two ways: as granting immunity to all actions taken in perfor-
mance of an initially discretionary decision, or as granting immunity to all
decisions-at whatever level-that themselves involved policy choices.9 2 The
Court made clear its adherence to the latter view of Dalehite, by emphasizing
that immunity in Varig was granted to FAA employees because they had the
authority to make policy judgments and take calculated risks in order to ad-
vance governmental aims." All of this is arguably beneficial and certainly
defensible. But the view the Court took of the exception is an extremely sweep-
ing one in that it wipes out prior indications by the Court that the exception
would be limited to choices of basic planning goals, and cancels efforts of
lower federal courts to impose such a limitation. The exception will now apply
to determinations by governmental officials, at however low a level, regard-
87. See Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981 (D. Haw. 1965) (United States negligent
in giving student pilot clearance to take off).
88. This is the view strongly advocated by Harris & Schnepper, supra note 47, at 188-90.
89. A good discussion of this definition and of Dalehite is found in Comment, Agent Orange
and the Government Contract Defense: Are Military Manufacturers Immune from Products Liabili-
ty?, 36 U. MwAn L. REv. 489, 516-17 (1982).
90. See Note, Sovereign Immunity-The Government Contractor Defense: Preserving the
Government's Discretionary Design Decisions, 57 TEM. L.Q. 697, 705 (1984) (citing Payton v.
United States, 636 F.2d 132, 143 (5th Cir. 1981) (release of psychotic prisoner from federal prison
involved some nondiscretionary activities)). See generally Note, Federal Tort Claims Act: The
Development and Application of the Discretionary Function Exemption, 13 CumB. L. REv. 535,
567 (1983) (due to separation of powers doctrine, judicial branch should not examine certain
executive-level decisions); Note, Separation of Powers and the Discretionary Function Excep-
tion: Political Question in Tort Litigation Against the Government, 56 IowA L. REv. 930 (1971).
91. See Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984) (Congress created exceptions to Act
in order to prevent disruption of government activities, avoid exposure of U.S. to liability for
excessive or fraudulent claims, and exclude from coverage suits for which adequate remedies
were already available; exception concerning detention of goods by customs officers here applied).
92. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 98.
93. See Varig, 467 U.S. at 820.
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ing the method of applying statutes or regulations in order to acheive govern-
mental purposes - not just to the adoption or rejection of particular pur-
poses. The exception applies not merely to enactment of rules, not merely
even to decisions to enforce rules, but also to the manner of enforcement
so long as some "policy judgment" lies behind the selection of the manner.
"Discretion," in effect, is now interpreted not to mean "planning for the
future" but "judgment-calls based on governmental goals." Is this desirable,
or could a better test be developed?
Suggestions of Commentators: Does Varig Incorporate Them?
It has been suggested that the discretionary function exception might be
eliminated altogether without significant harm to the government. Elimina-
tion of the exception would be no more likely to cause financial ruin to the
federal government than conventional tort liability is to wreck private
businesses. The elimination of immunity could well result in more effective
government through more thorough examination of decisions by its officials.9"
It is argued that fear of interference with govermental officials' free exercise
of judgment may, to the extent such fear is justified, be quashed by the grant
of individual immunity to such officials, rather than blanket immunity to the
government. 5 Such arguments must be addressed to Congress in support of
Congress' repeal of the discretionary function exception. Concern about
possibly overwhelming government liability, the desire to ensure a means by
which the courts can restrict such liability, and worry about preserving the
independence of the judicial and legislative branches and of high governmen-
tal administrators are all likely to make such repeal very difficult. So long
as the exception remains, it must be applied; and the Varig opinion shows
a willingness to apply it sweepingly and often.
Some new proposals for interpreting the exception had appeared even prior
to Varig. Discussion of the Act by commentators-in contrast to Varig-has
tended to take the attitude that immunity is in broad terms waived by the
Act and should not be assumed to exist unless an exception very clearly ap-
plies.9 One authority urges a test that involves the weighing of three factors,
all of which have been emphasized in various court opinions over the years:
(1) Whether the injury resulted from government initiation of an activity or
merely from the activity's performance; (2) whether the decision was made
at the planning level after consideration of public policy; and (3) whether
the decision involved the weighing of political and social factors or merely
94. See Note, Inadequacies of Federal Sovereign Immunity: A New Perspective, 61 GEo.
L.J. 1535, 1549 (1973).
95. See Bermann, Integrating Governmental and Officer Tort Liability, 77 CoLUM. L. REv.
1175, 1213-14 (1977) (stressing the need to recognize the different interests that lie behind govern-
mental immunity and official immunity).
96. See Steffen, A Federal Tort Claims Act Tort, 34 TENN. L. REv. 367, 370-71 (1967) (citing
general rules of statutory construction).
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technical ones.97 The author adds that immunity should not apply even to
all policy determinations-in particular, it should not necessarily apply to such
determinations where made merely to save money. As with the Varig opin-
ion, this test deemphasizes the status of the official making the decision; but
unlike Varig, it would confine immunity largely to decisions to undertake basic
programs. The various factors of the proposed test are all ones that have
at times been utilized by the courts in applying the planning v. operational
test.99 It is submitted that the proposal really amounts to a summary of the
cases decided under the planning v. operational test, even though the author
is critical of that standard. But the author is certainly correct in stating' 0
the exception has been deemed necessary for the purpose of preventing the
courts from determining government policy and of ensuring separation of
powers between the judiciary and the other branches of government. The listed
factors of the proposed test are directed toward those aims. The Varig opi-
nion, however, by extending immunity to negligent enforcement of regula-
tions, exceeds any such aims.
Professor Peck has suggested that immunity should exist when the con-
sideration of liability would necessarily call into question the propriety of ob-
jectives or programs, or of a decision made by one who, within the scope
of his authority, had exercised the particular choice with the purpose of ad-
vancing government objectives. ' This suggestion builds on the judicial
language that immunity should be limited to policy decisions.' 2 The Varig
opinion adopted this suggestion to the extent that immunity applies to all
as a "policy judgment" and defines this judgment as involving the weighing
of risks against benefits. Peck's suggestion, like the Varig test, leaves the door
open for a very broad interpretation of "discretion."' 0 3 Varig, however, ap-
pears to go further in its use of the exception to immunize even implementa-
tion of policy.
97. Note, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of the Planning Level-Operational Level Test,
U.S.F. L. REv. 170, 192-95 (1976).
98. Id. at 195-97.
99. See supra notes 12-43 and accompanying text.
100. Note, supra note 97, at 190, stating "[e]ssentially, the exception attempts to keep the
federal courts from second-guessing policy decisions made in good faith, although negligently,
by federal officials."
101. Peck, supra note 80, at 417-18, quoting his suggestion made in Peck, The Federal Tort
Claims Act-A Proposed Construction of the Discretionary Function Exception, 31 WASH. L.
REv. 207 (1956). Professor Peck notes that his analysis was largely adopted by the Washington
Supreme Court in Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d 246, 407 P.2d
440 (1965), and was endorsed in K. DAvis, ADmnusxTAnE LAW Ti AaaSE 846-49 (Supp. 1970).
102. Peck quotes Johnson v. State, 69 Cal. 2d 782, 794 n.8, 73 Cal. Rptr. 240, 249 n.8, 447
P.2d 352, 361 n.8 (1968), in stating, "[i]mmunity for 'discretionary' activities serves no purpose
except to assure that courts refuse to pass judgment on policy decisions in the province of coor-
dinate branches of government." Peck, supra note 80, at 417. Cf. Dalehite v. United States,
346 U.S. 15, 35-36 (1953) ("Where there is room for policy judgment and decision there is
discretion.").
103. See Reynolds, supra note 10, at 114.
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Another suggestion made in recent years'"" would use the Administrative
Procedure Act' 5 (the "APA") as a guideline in applying the discretionary
function exception of the Act: Issues that can be resolved in an APA suit-
that is, a suit challenging the conduct of some federal administrative agency
that is brought under the APA-should not be brought as tort suits. Judicial
review under the APA was intended, for instance, to handle claims of abuse
of agency discretion, unconstitutionality of legislation, and illegality of rules
and regulations.106 Where a broad program affecting numerous people in the
present and future is initiated, review of legality (including constitutionality)
and of the propriety of procedures should be available, but not tort liability.
"Judicial review to ensure no abuse of discretion, no violation of law, and
compliance with proper procedures is appropriate. The tort standards of
reasonableness, proximate cause, and duty, however, do not lend themselves
to such determinations. They were developed to apply to specific private acts
on a case-by-case basis.'' 0 7
Thus, a tort suit, rather than an APA action charging unconstitutionality
or abuse of discretion, is appropriate in situations where negligent driving
of an automobile, or malpractice within a government hospital, is alleged,
while the APA suit should be used if the allegation is issuance of improper
regulations. This, again, would seem a helpful guide to what is and is not
within the discretionary exception; but as the author of the suggestion ad-
mits, the exception's legislative history does not refer to the APA, which,
indeed, was passed in the same year as the Act. 00 Again, the underlying idea
can clearly be seen in the suggestion that the exception should cover develop-
ment of policy, or planning for the future, but not routine implementation.
And again, the suggestion was not followed by Varig, which would apply
the exception even to conduct that is inappropriate for APA review so long
as some "policy judgment" is present.
Reaction to Varig
What has been the aftermath of the Varig decision in the courts and com-
mentaries? Predictably, it has been followed by many sweeping applications
of the discretionary function exception. Of course, some of the cases finding
the exception applicable might well have been decided the same way prior
to Varig. For instance, one court held an FAA decision not to impose im-
mediate regulation on a particular type of aircraft, but to postpone a decision
104. Rogers, A Fresh Look at Agency "Discretion," 57 Tum. L. REv. 776, 804-09 (1983).
105. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976).
106. See Rogers, supra note 104, at 808 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 1287, 79th Cong., 1st Sess.
6 (1945), an oft-quoted portion of the legislative history of the discretionary function exception
of the Federal Tort Claims Act listing the types of cases not intended to be brought under the
Tort Claims Act). See generally Dolan, Constitutional Torts and the Federal Tort Claims Act,
14 U. RicH. L. Rav. 281 (1980).
107. Rogers, supra note 104, at 814.




and accept comments on the proposed rules, a discretionary decision and thus
within the exception.1° 9 The same is true as to a government decision to delegate
safety responsibility over rail yard workers largely to employers, with the
government conducting only "spot checks" of employer safety programs."'
Such decisions clearly involve choices undertaking or declining to undertake
programs.
Many cases have involved decisions that arguably entail only the execution
of programs or implementation of regulations. Thus, one court held the ex-
ception extends not only to broad policy decisions regarding the admission
or release of Cuban refugees in general, but also to the "operational deci-
sion" to allow a particular Cuban refugee, known to be a felon convicted
of a violent crime, to enter the United States.I 1 The selection and supervision
of participants in the federal witness protection program, 1' 2 the use of and
control over an informant in a Veterans Administration investigation of il-
legal drug sales,113 and the failure of government inspectors to warn workers
on inspected premises of dangers to which they were being exposed"1 4 have
all been held by post- Varig courts to be within the exception. Failure to make
adequate inspections of facilities on which federal funds are spent has been
held immune, 'I as has the negligent performance of inspections that did take
place." 6 Even such mundane determinations as the decision not to post a
lifeguard at a developed swimming site in a national forest " 7 and the Postal
Service's decision to sell a used Jeep without warning the buyer of the vehi-
cle's propensity to overturn" 8 have been held discretionary functions. The
same is true of negligence of the National Weather Service in predicting weather
and tidal conditions.19
Occasionally, an opinion can be found, even in the post- Varig era, in which
an activity is held to be outside the exception. Thus, one court found the
109. Baxley v. United States, 767 F.2d 1095 (4th Cir. 1985).
110. Feyers v. United States, 749 F.2d 1222 (6th Cir, 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1125 (1985).
111. Flammia v. United States, 739 F.2d 202 (5th Cir. 1984).
112. Jet Indus., Inc. v. United States, 777 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S.
1115 (1986).
113. Pooler v. United States, 787 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 849 (1986).
114. See Merklin v. United States, 788 F.2d 172 (3d Cir. 1986) (former foreman in radioactive
ore processing plant claims that New Jersey's good samaritan rule imposed duty on Atomic Energy
Commission's inspectors to warn plant workers of health hazards discovered during inspections).
Cf. Shuman v. United States, 765 F.2d 283 (1st Cir. 1985) (asbestos-related death of shipyard
worker where government was sued for failure to warn of exposure).
115. Pennbank v. United States, 779 F.2d 175 (3d Cir. 1985) (expenditure of federal funds
for municipal sewer project was discretionary function barring action for negligence in failing
to inspect and discover defect in project).
116. Hylin v. United States, 755 F.2d 551 (7th Cir. 1985) (exception barred claim based on
negligent acts and omissions of federal mine inspectors where death was caused by defective
electrical junction box in mine).
117. Wysinger v. United States, 784 F.2d 1252 (5th Cir. 1986).
118. Ford v. American Motors Corp., 770 F.2d 465 (5th Cir. 1985).
119. Spencer v. New Orleans Levee Bd., 737 F.2d 435 (5th Cir. 1984).
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negligent operation of a lock on the Tennessee River to be ordinary "garden-
variety" negligence by government workers and hence not immune from liabil-
ity. 20 Another court made a distinction between a decision to award a defense
contract to a particular contractor, which was found within the exception,
and a failure by the Defense Department to enforce the contractor's com-
pliance with safety regulations, which was ruled outside the exception. The
court made this distinction because no judgment involving agency policy was
involved.' 2' An occasional case may still distinguish between the making of
a decision and the decision's execution, as where the Coast Guard's execution
of a decision to establish temporary buoys as an aid to navigation was held
outside the exception. 122 At least one court has still found it possible to apply
the planning v. operational test, ruling that whether the government can be
liable for the Army Corps of Engineers' decisions on design of a particular
flood-control project depends on whether the decisions involved policy (i.e.,
planning) considerations.' 2 Government decisions and actions after Varig,
however, can, in the view of most courts, be outside the exception only if
they involve mere carelessness in the handling of details.
Commentators have assailed the Varig decision as creating confusion in
general,'2 " and as leaving unclear in particular the situation as to negligently
performed government inspections.' 25 One author suggested the planning v.
operational test is not necessarily dead, since it might be used to determine
what are the "policy judgments" protected under Varig, and that it is the
lower federal courts that are likely to remain the really significant interpreters
of the exception.'2 6 Another commentator, however, believes Varig definitely
120. Chotin Transp., Inc. v. United States, 784 F.2d 206, 211 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 344 (1987).
121. McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985). Cf. Berkowitz v. United States,
108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988) (failure to comply with statute or regulations in licensing of vaccine would
be outside exception).
122. Drake Towing Co. v. Meisner Marine Constr. Co., 765 F.2d 1060 (11th Cir. 1985).
123. Alabama Elec. Coop., Inc. v. United States, 769 F.2d 1523 (11th Cir. 1985) (dismissal
based on discretionary function exception reversed; yarig said to support planning-v.-operational
distinction). This court rejected the opinion of Johnston v. United States, 597 F. Supp. 473,
434 (D. Kan. 1984), in which the district court said the planning-v.-operational test was eliminated
by Varig.
124. See Comment, United States v. Varig: Can the King Only Do Little Wrongs?, 22 CAL.
W. L. REv. 175 (1985). The author suggests ten questions to be weighed in determining whether
or not the discretionary function exception applies to a particular case. Id. at 194-95. The arti-
cle's title draws on the Dalehite dissent's statement that the Act must be treated as covering
more than traffic accidents or else "the ancient and discredited doctrine that 'The King can
do no wrong' has not been uprooted; it has merely been amended to read, 'The King can do
only little wrongs." Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 60 (1953).
125. See Zillman, Regulatory Discretion: The Supreme Court Reexamines the Discretionary
Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 110 Mm. L. Ray. 115 (1985). See generally
Comment, United States v. Varig: Can the King Only Do Little Wrongs?, 22 CAL. W. L. Rav.
175, 197-99 (1985) (a required inspection negligently performed should be within the area of
possible liability); McMichael v. United States, 751 F.2d 303 (8th Cir. 1985).
126. See Zillman, supra note 125, at 142. For an example of continued use of the planning-v.-




rejected the planning v. operational test that had so often been employed by
lower courts.' 2 7 Apparently, the Supreme Court has abolished those opinions
which imposed a "Good Samaritan" duty on the United States.' 28 Arguably,
almost any negligence of regulatory agencies must now be regarded as within
the exception, 29 and it is possible that any negligence in carrying out regula-
tions must be similarly treated. 3
In one limited respect, a later Supreme Court case narrowed and clarified
the Varig decision. In Berkowitz v. United States,13 1 the court held the discre-
tionary exception does not immunize from liability any decisions made or
actions taken in violation of federal statutes, regulations or specific policies.
Thus, a government agency's licensing of an oral polio vaccine without receiv-
ing the safety data required by statutory directive would not be protected by
the exception. The Court, however, reiterated the broad "public policy"
test of Varig, stating the exception insulates from liability any decisions in-
volving an element of judgment or choice and that are based on public
policy. 33 Varig and Dalehite are left largely undisturbed, with the Court merely
assuring that there is no discretion to violate specific statutory or regulatory
law. 134
What Should Be The Test?
A "need for clearly articulated standards to guide judicial applications of
the discretionary function exception"'' 35 has long been recognized. The Supreme
127. Comment, United States v. Varig Airlines: The Supreme Court Narrows the Scope of
Government Liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 51 J. Am. L. & COM. 197, 231, 239 (1985).
128. See Hatfield, Negligent Certification of Aircraft: Supreme Court Rules Federal Govern-
ment Not Liable, 20 FoRUM 359, 372 (1985).
129. See Comment, supra note 127, at 227.
130. See Comment, supra note 124, at 192-94 & 199 (stating that an actual negligent inspec-
tion was never clearly addressed in Varig but that the opinion leaves the door open for holding
the negligence of a government agency in carrying out regulatory functions to be within the
exception).
131. 108 S. Ct. 1954 (1988). This is the only "discretionary function exception" opinion handed
down by the Court since the Varig case.
132. Id. at 1963. The Court noted that if petitioners were merely claiming that the government
agency complied with regulatory standards but made an incorrect determination, immunity would
turn on whether the determination appropriately involved any policy choice-a question not ad-
dressed in detail by the parties in this case. Therefore, this issue was left-if pressed by plaintiffs-
for district court determination on remand. Id. Cf. Baker v. United States, 817 F.2d 560 (9th
Cir. 1987) (negligent decision to license vaccine not barred by exception), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 2845 (1988).
133. Id. at 1958-60.
134. See Fortney v. United States, 109 S. Ct. 210 (1988), vacating and remanding, for further
consideration in light of Berkowitz, a case concerning an explosion at an Army munitions plant.
The majority remanded for determination of whether a "specific mandatory directive" of a law
had been violated. Four Justices dissented, noting that the district court had, in any event, found
no violation of the relevant directive. Fortney, 109 S. Ct. at 211.
135. Comment, Scope of the Discretionary Function Exception Under the Federal Tort Claims
Act, 67 GEo. L.J. 879, 898 (1979).
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Court attempted to satisfy that need in the Varig case, but fell back on a
broad interpretation of "discretion" that (1) does not supply clear answers
to the question of when "policy judgment" is present-the test employed by
the Court, and (2) revives the worry, originated by the earlier Dalehite opi-
nion, that the exception will be so broadly applied as to swallow the Act.
Many of the tests suggested over the years by commentators and the courts
have some merit: it is the making of policy, not its implementation, that should
generally be free from judicial "second-guessing" in order to protect separa-
tion of powers. Discretion is chiefly present in situations in which there is
no pre-existing standard to apply but in which a government officer must
develop the standard (that is, policy) on his own. Normally the initiation of
programs, not the execution of them, necessitates legislative and executive
independence from full-scale judicial review. The initiation should be reviewable
only in an APA action challenging the constitutionality or other legality of
the program. The propriety of basic government objectives and choices should
be within the "discretion" that is protected from tort liability.
All these suggested tests employ factors that can appropriately be weighed
in applying the planning v. operational distinction developed by the lower
federal courts. The planning v. operational test has been applied more than
any other test under the discretionary exception. The basic concern under the
planning v. operational test is protection of the legislating and regulating pro-
cess from judicial review and from imposition of liability wherever planning
for the future is concerned. The choice of goals and the initiation of pro-
grams is thereunder shielded from any review that utilizes tort standards of
reasonableness; a reasonableness review of such basic decisions should rest
only with the electorate. On the other hand, it is unnecessary to the separation-
of-powers concept that every exercise of administrative judgment-even if bas-
ed only on mistaken ideas of efficiency or cost-saving, or on mistaken no-
tions of what are the relevant government goals-be protected from liability,
as occurs under Varig. Such a result again leaves the Act applicable to little
except negligent automobile driving.3
Varig, other recent cases and writings have had the desirable effect of mak-
ing clear that the emphasis in applying the exception should be on the deci-
sion, not the decision-maker. Because governmental immunity and not in-
dividual immunity is involved, the rank and position of the individual should
be largely immaterial. The immunity applies to conduct rather than to per-
sons. Varig, however, as well as some critics of the planning v. operational
test, ignores the basic purpose of the statute: To treat the government, when
it performs functions comparable to those performed by private persons and
entities, as liable in tort to the same extent as those private persons and en-
tities would be treated.1 37 It is only the functions of the government exercised
136. See Gellhorn & Lauer, Federal Liability for Personal and Property Damage, 29 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 1325, 1326 (1954), suggesting in light of Dalehite that the Federal Tort Claims Act should
be re-titled "The Federal Negligent Operation of Motor Vehicles Act." See also authorities cited
supra note 5.




when it is making policy as a government-acting of, by and for the people-
that need to be immunized from tort liability in order to maintain legislative
and executive independence of the judiciary. These protected functions are
the planning ones. "The planning aspects are synonymous with policy con-
siderations such as financial, political, economic and social effects. This is
readily distinguishable from operational or day-to-day activities where immuni-
ty would not exist."'1
38
Conclusion
The Supreme Court should reconsider the basic purpose of the Act and
should re-evaluate the test developed through several decades of experience,
by the lower federal judiciary: The planning v. operational test. The test will
not bring certainty of result; no test will bring such certainty. But the plann-
ing v. operational test will allow adequate consideration of all relevant fac-
tors, while still preserving the basic intent and purpose of the Act-to make
the government liable to those it tortiously injures.
Inc. v. United States, 753 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (the Act makes the United States liable
in accord with local tort law). But Varig treats Rayonier, Inc. as leaving Dalehite fundamentally
unchanged-rejecting it only to the extent that it indicated federal liability under the Act is limited
to that of a municipal corporation or other public body. Varig, 467 U.S. at 813 n.10.
138. Harris & Schnepper, supra note 47, at 189.
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